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BRINGING ‘PLACE’ BACK IN: REGIONAL CLUSTERS, PROJECT GOVERNANCE, 
AND NEW PRODUCT OUTCOMES 
Abstract 
We examine new product outcomes in the context of regional clusters. Based on past research on 
marketing relationships, clusters, and social networks, we propose that the overall configuration 
of a cluster helps promote particular governance practices among its members. These practices 
have distinct value-creating properties, and when they are brought to bear on a specific new 
product development project within a cluster, they promote performance outcomes like product 
novelty and speed to market. Ultimately, these performance effects are reinforced by the 
configuration of the cluster itself. In general, we propose that new product outcomes follow from 
complex interactions between a cluster’s macro-level configuration and its micro-level 
governance processes. More broadly, our framework points to the importance of geographical 
variables and to the role of “place” in marketing decision-making.  
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Relentless innovation, and the new products to which it gives rise, underpins long-term 
marketing performance. New product failure rates, however, remain stubbornly high, a fact that 
has motivated both scholars and practitioners to unearth the drivers of successful product 
development. Historically, researchers have focused on internal drivers of product success such 
as the nature of a firm’s overall strategy (e.g., Gatignon and Xuereb 1997), its planning processes 
(e.g., Moorman and Miner 1998), its organizational structure (e.g., Olson et al. 1995), and its 
particular development activities (Griffin 1997; Sethi et al. 2001). Increasingly, however, 
scholars have expanded their focus to consider how innovation processes involve outside 
partners and are managed across organizational boundaries (Fang 2011; Rindfleisch and 
Moorman 2001; Sivadas and Dwyer 2000; Tellis et al. 2012).  
This shift in orientation reflects a growing realization that marketing practices, including 
new product development (NPD), are carried out within inter-firm networks (Achrol and Kotler 
1999; Wuyts and Van den Bulte 2012). We focus on a particular category of networks; those that 
are spatially confined and whose members are geographically co-located or clustered. Such 
networks are of considerable interest to marketers because of their presumed ability to promote 
innovation and NPD. Surprisingly, however, despite long and sustained research interest in other 
academic disciplines like geography (e.g., Gertler 1995), economics (e.g., Krugman 1991), 
strategy (e.g., Porter 2000), and organization theory (e.g., Tallman and Phene 2007), there has 
been, with some notable exceptions (e.g., Ganesan et al. 2005), few systematic attempts in 
marketing to explore the role of regional clusters. The lack of attention is particularly surprising 
given marketing’s historical concern with ‘place’ (McCarthy 1960) which suggests that 
geographical variables and reasoning are of fundamental importance. 
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While geographical clustering is sometimes portrayed as a panacea for innovation 
(Martin and Sunley 2003), we note that clusters vary considerably with respect to their 
innovation outcomes. Although there are numerous accounts of successful clusters such as 
Silicon Valley in California (Kenney 2000) and Baden-Württemberg in southwest Germany 
(Fuchs and Wassermann 2005), there is also evidence that clustering does not automatically lead 
to improved performance. In fact, many well-known clusters, for example the “multimedia super 
corridor” in Malaysia, have fallen short of initial expectations (Ramasamy et al. 2004). Others, 
such as the biotechnology cluster in the Lombardy region of Italy, have been deemed outright 
failures (Orsenigo 2001). 
The mixed body of evidence raises questions about the specific manner in which clusters 
promote performance, including new product success. In much of the cluster literature, 
consistent with its roots in economic geography, performance is assumed to follow from the 
phenomenon of clustering per se; namely from a given cluster’s overall structure or 
configuration (e.g., Markusen 1996; Romanelli and Khessina 2005). Recent research, in contrast, 
has focused on a cluster’s internal processes. Specifically, researchers (e.g., Atherton and 
Johnston 2008; Bell et al. 2009) have suggested that performance follows from the particular 
way in which individual cluster transactions are governed.   
 The emerging theoretical view of clusters is a complex and nuanced one, where 
performance is seen as a function of both a cluster’s configuration and its internal governance 
processes. At the same time, despite increasing acceptance of such a perspective, as evidenced 
by assertions that “clustered firms are situated in both geographic and social structural spaces” 
(Whittington et al. 2009, p. 90), the specific roles of cluster configuration and process, and how 
these roles ultimately impact performance, remain elusive.  
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We focus on two particular roles of cluster configuration. First, we draw on social 
network theory (Antia and Frazier 2001; Provan et al. 2007; Wuyts and Van den Bulte 2012) to 
propose that certain cluster configurations promote the emergence of particular governance 
practices among its members in the first place. Specifically, dense clusters promote relational 
governance (Lusch and Brown 1996; Macneil 1980), while centralized clusters give rise to 
hierarchical governance  (Mooi and Ghosh 2010; Stinchcombe 1986). These governance 
practices, when brought to bear on a given product development project, are associated with 
particular performance outcomes. Specifically, we argue that relational governance has the 
ability to both identify and help commercialize truly novel products, while hierarchical 
governance helps products’ speed to market.  
Second, beyond promoting the emergence of particular governance practices ex ante, we 
propose that a cluster’s overall configuration will support their performance effects ex post. 
Specifically, relational governance’s ability to promote product novelty is enhanced within dense 
clusters, while hierarchical governance’s ability to promote speed to market is enhanced within 
centralized clusters. In other words, we posit that matches between cluster configuration and 
project-level governance have specific value-creating properties. Conversely, we propose that 
mismatches between cluster configuration and project governance can produce transaction costs 
that undermine new product outcomes. In general, we develop a complex and nuanced account 
of how new product outcomes in a cluster context come about, where a single variable like 
cluster configuration actually plays multiple roles. 
With this framework, we seek to make five contributions. First, we show the relevance of 
clustering to a key marketing phenomenon. Theoretically, we propose a macro-level perspective 
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on new product development; a perspective which remains underutilized in marketing, as 
evidenced by Tellis’ (2013) recent review.  
Second, we add to the existing literature on inter-firm governance. Historically, the 
emphasis in this literature has been on the micro-level mechanisms themselves (e.g., Wathne and 
Heide 2000). Emerging research, however, shows that the effects of governance mechanisms 
depend on the larger contexts in which they are deployed (Antia and Frazier 2001; Wuyts and 
Van den Bulte 2012). We add to past research by proposing specific constellations between 1) 
two different governance mechanisms (relational, hierarchical) and 2) two different cluster 
configurations (density, centralization). Theoretically, our framework points to larger systems of 
governance, where matches and mismatches between mechanisms and configuration impact 
performance.  
Third, we provide particular insights into relational governance. As noted by Gibbons and 
Henderson (2012), such governance practices are both common and important to firms. It is less 
than clear, however, how relational practices actually originate. In fact, researchers have argued 
that relational governance “can’t be deployed at will” (Ghosh and John 2012). Our framework 
suggests that cluster density is a particular driver of relational governance.  
Fourth, from a practical standpoint we point to an important source of efficiency in new 
product development. An NPD project, such as the development of a new car model, involves 
multiple collaborators that span upstream component design and manufacturing as well as 
downstream distribution. To the extent that the relevant parties, by virtue of their cluster 
membership, subscribe to common governance practices, they will benefit from reduced on-
going transaction costs that may otherwise harm new product performance.    
7 
 
Fifth, our framework contributes to the original cluster literature and to economic 
geography more broadly. Historically, the literature on clusters has tended to focus exclusively 
on the early part of the innovation process, namely idea generation. We propose that the 
implications of clustering go beyond this initial stage. In fact, the ability to bring common 
governance practices to bear on a new project offers coordination benefits which affect the entire 
product development process; from the initial idea and the “fuzzy front end” to final 
commercialization.  
The paper is organized in the following fashion: In the section below, we establish some 
basic cluster concepts and suggest possible linkages with specific marketing outcomes. Next, we 
present our conceptual framework and research propositions. The final section articulates our 
contributions and offers suggestions for marketing practice and future research.  
Clusters and Performance Outcomes 
We follow Porter (1998, p. 197) in defining clusters as “geographic concentrations of 
interconnected companies… and associated institutions”. He and others make the distinction 
between a cluster’s vertical dimensions (i.e., customers and suppliers) and its horizontal 
dimensions (i.e., competitors and firms that produce complementary products and provide 
specialized services such as venture capital). More developed clusters often include actors such 
as research-intensive universities, trade bodies, and professional associations. While there 
continues to be much debate and disagreement in the literature, Porter’s conception of clusters 
has become widely used in part because it synthesizes ideas from prominent overlapping schools 
of thought within economic geography (Martin and Sunley 2003), including the work on “new 
industrial spaces” (Scott 1988), “regional innovation systems” (Edquist 1997), and “industrial 
districts” (Beccatini 1989). Although there are substantive differences between these 
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perspectives, they each view clusters as characterized by three basic features (Asheim et al. 
2013; McKendrick et al. 2000; Tallman et al. 2004).  
First, while they do not have fixed borders, clusters comprise members co-located in an 
identifiable location, although the geographical scale of the location may vary significantly. For 
example, Porter draws on the sprawling agribusiness cluster on the West Coast of the US that 
spans state boundaries, and the media cluster in New York that is confined to part of lower 
Manhattan, to illustrate his arguments. Second, clusters comprise members that interact with and 
are related to one another; a firm that is co-located with other similar firms in a given place but 
does not transact with them is not considered a member of a particular cluster. This means that 
cluster membership involves the exchange of resources, including physical and human assets, 
with other actors in the cluster. Third, cluster members have a shared sense that they are part of 
the cluster; a common feeling that they are situated in a particular community. In other words, to 
belong to a cluster constituent firms need to identify as cluster members and hold what 
Romanelli and Khessina (2005) call a “regional identity”. In the marketing literature, Achrol 
(1997) refers to this in terms of a feeling of “belongingness”. Because of these variations in 
scope, the demarcation of cluster boundaries is seldom straightforward. Indeed, a basic 
assumption in the literature is that the confines of a given cluster are continually evolving 
(Dicken and Malmberg 2001; Eisingerich et al. 2010; Feser and Bergman 2000; O’Donoghue 
and Gleave 2004).  
A considerable body of research has focused on various aspects of performance in 
clusters, in particular on innovation outcomes. Specifically, performance follows from utilizing 
knowledge and other intangible resources to create and market novel products and services 
(Arikan 2009; Owen-Smith and Powell 2004; Tallman et al. 2004; Whittington et al. 2009). 
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In developing our conceptual framework, we rely on the general conceptualization of 
performance as rooted in innovation outcomes. However, our conceptualization differs from past 
work in two distinct ways: First, previous research has tended to apply the notion of innovation 
to a cluster as a whole. While such a focus is consistent with the idea of a “region” as a 
competitive unit in its own right (Bristow 2005; Cooke 2001), it also obscures potential insights 
made possible by considering performance at the level of individual NPD projects. Second, 
while we remain true to the general emphasis in past research on innovation, we draw on recent 
research in marketing (Ganesan et al. 2005; Rindfleisch and Moorman 2001) to provide a more 
fine-grained conceptualization which encompasses two different new product outcomes, namely 
product novelty and speed to market. We define novelty as the extent to which the focal products 
differs from competing alternatives in a way that is meaningful to customers (Dewar and Dutton 
1986; Fang 2011; Simon 1985). Speed refers to the elapsed time from the initial idea stage of the 
process to the actual market launch (Fang 2011; Rindfleisch and Moorman 2001). 
New Product Development Projects and Governance  
Our unit of analysis is a particular NPD project, which can be defined as a temporary 
organizational entity used to integrate activities and people across different organizational and 
disciplinary domains with the objective of launching a specific product (Morris et al. 2011). In 
practice, a project involves the entire conversion process from an initial idea to a commercialized 
product (e.g., Chandy et al. 2006; Fang 2011). For instance, launching a new car model requires 
managing the interfaces between up- and downstream parties that span component supply, 
design, manufacturing, marketing, sales, and distribution (Adler 1995; Terwiesch et al. 2002).  
While successful conversion depends fundamentally on integration between the relevant 
parties, past research has pointed to various barriers or sources of  “friction” (Arrow 1969) that 
may compromise favorable outcomes (Griffin and Hauser 1996; Staudenmayer et al. 2005). 
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Overcoming these barriers requires deliberate relationship governance across the relevant 
interfaces to ensure “order” (Commons 1931). The challenge goes beyond managing the 
technical interfaces per se (e.g., between design and manufacturing); the larger task involves a 
“mapping between the product architecture and the organizational structure” (Sosa 2007).     
Past research (e.g., Geyskens et al. 2006; Poppo and Zenger 2002; Wathne and Heide 
2004) has shown that purposeful governance can take different forms. Specifically, researchers 
have made a conceptual distinction between 1) relational governance mechanisms which are 
rooted in informal norms and implicit understandings (Gibbons 2010; Macneil 1981), and 2) 
hierarchical governance mechanisms like contractual arrangements which establish decision 
rights and specify acceptable behaviors (Grossman and Hart 1986; McKendrick et al. 2000; 
Mooi and Ghosh 2010). The central premise of relational governance is to align parties’ 
preferences ex ante, while hierarchical governance involves imposing restrictions which regulate 
their on-going interaction (Bradach and Eccles 1989; Ouchi 1980). In the terminology of intra-
organizational coordination (Burns and Stalker 1961; Gerwin 2004; Thompson 1967), the latter 
involves mechanistic “planning”, in contrast with the organic “mutual adjustment” that defines 
relational governance.  
Importantly, while both strategies involve purposeful governance, they possess different 
properties. As a consequence they can be expected to have different antecedents, some of which 
pertain to the nature of the larger cluster in which the focal firms are located. We turn to this 
question next.    
Cluster Configuration and NPD Project Governance 
 Our conceptual framework is shown in Figure 1. Its key exogenous influences are a 
cluster’s aggregate properties or its configuration. We draw on network theory – in particular 
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research that takes a whole-of-network
2
 perspective to the study of organizations (e.g., Baum et 
al. 2003; Provan et al. 2007; Provan and Kenis 2008). We describe a cluster in terms of its 
density (the overall connectedness among organizations within a network) and centralization (the 
extent to which one or a few organizations are more centrally located than others). Below, we 
first consider how density and centralization promote the emergence of distinctive governance 
practices that can be brought to bear on NPD projects within the cluster. 
Cluster Density and NPD Project Governance. Cluster density refers to the relative 
number of ties in a network that links cluster members. It is the ratio of the number of 
relationships that exist in a cluster network to the total number of possible ties if each cluster 
member was connected to every other member (Rowley 1997). The effects of cluster density on 
governance choices within NPD projects can be understood broadly in terms of an access logic 
(Gnyawali and Madhavan 2001), in that access to other actors in dense clusters is facilitated by 
the multiple paths connecting cluster members. An example of a well-known high-density cluster 
is Silicon Alley in Manhattan, New York (Neff 2005). The area incorporates the Flatiron district 
and neighboring Chelsea, Tribeca, and Soho and is home to a high concentration of interrelated 
Internet and new media companies. It is third only to Silicon Valley and Route 128 in Boston in 
terms of venture capital investment.   
We expect cluster density to promote relational governance practices among cluster 
members. This is because dense clusters support the emergence of shared relationship norms 
among constituent firms, which is a defining feature of relational governance (Macneil 1981). 
                                                        
2
 This perspective, grounded in Wasserman and Galaskiewicz’s (1994) and Kilduff and Tsai’s (2003) work on social 
network theory, comprises a set of metrics which help map the relationships inherent to regional clusters. To date, 
however, network research has mostly been applied to clusters using an ‘egocentric’ perspective in which the focal 
unit of analysis is the individual organization (e.g., Casper 2007; Owen-Smith and Powell 2004). Egocentric cluster 
research is clear on the influence of a particular firm’s location within a cluster, however unlike a whole-of-network 
perspective, it does not shed light upon the properties of the cluster as a whole. 
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Specifically, dense clusters facilitate access to other cluster members, which promotes norm 
formation through socialization and information accessibility. First, firms in a dense cluster more 
readily converge upon frames of reference, values, and attitudes through being exposed directly 
to, and learning from, the behaviors of other organizations within the cluster. Gençtürk and 
Aulakh (2007), for example, demonstrate that firms build relational governance more effectively 
when socialization within a group is stronger. Second, the local reputation systems that 
characterize dense clusters lead to faster convergence upon shared norms: News of 
uncooperative behavior spreads especially quickly in these contexts (Argote et al. 2003), which 
helps to establish the informal “rules of the game” (North 1987) that underpin relational 
governance.  
As a specific example, Piore and Sabel (1984) describe how clusters exhibit the relational 
norm of flexibility. Once such broad norms have been established, they can be brought to bear on 
a given NPD project’s relationships and decisions. For instance, a norm of flexibility may govern 
upstream design decisions (e.g., between suppliers and a manufacturers), as well as downstream 
pricing decisions (e.g., between manufacturers and resellers). In the case of Silicon Alley, 
described above, such flexibility is considered to be a key element of the informal system of 
governance that underpins inter-firm cooperation and relationship building in that cluster 
(Asheim and Gertler 2005), and a core component of its success. We therefore propose: 
Proposition 1: The greater the density of the overall cluster, the higher the likelihood that 
relational governance practices can be brought to bear on a given NPD project. 
 
Consider next how relational governance practices, once established, impact a project’s 
performance outcomes. We expect the informal norms that characterize relational governance to 
help promote truly novel products (Dewar and Dutton 1986; Fang 2011). This is because of the 
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ability of relational governance to support three innovation-related processes, namely 1) 
information transfer, 2) information use, and 3) adaptation to changing circumstances.  
First, innovation at its core follows from novel combinations of tacit knowledge and 
competence (Fang 2011; Sivadas and Dwyer 2000; Sobrero and Roberts 2001; Von Hippel 1994; 
Wang et al. 2008). Extant social science research (e.g., Lawson and Lorenz 1999; Obstfeld 2005; 
Uzzi 1997) suggests that a relational governance structure, due to its particular communication 
codes and heuristics, is in a unique position to support the transfer of “thick” information 
between parties. Extant research in marketing (Dahlstrom et al. 1995; Olson et al. 1995) 
specifically shows that “organic” interfaces (Burns and Stalker 1961) facilitate information 
transmission that supports innovation.  
Second, because relational norms align parties’ goals, they promote the use of novel 
information. Terwiesch, Loch, and DeMeyer (2002, p. 402) note that while product development 
projects often “start in the dark” with unproven information which may be difficult and risky to 
apply, a supporting social structure gives parties the confidence to act on it, and without the need 
for extensive documentation (Uzzi 1997). For instance, Yalumba, an Australian winemaker in 
the Clare Valley in the South Australian wine cluster pioneered the use of the Stelvin® 
(screwcap) wine bottle closure – a truly novel product at the time. The development and 
subsequent widespread adoption of the screwcap closure was greatly aided by the pre-existing 
relational practices among the members of the cluster (Atkin et al. 2006).  
Third, relational norms facilitate adaptation to changing circumstances. Over the course 
of an NPD project, multiple adjustments may be made to a product’s technical architecture. In 
turn, downstream marketing decisions may need to be modified. Importantly, however, such 
adaptations are not automatic, because they impose costs on the firms in question (Buvik and 
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John 2000). However, the “unitary actor” heuristic (Macneil 1981) that underlies relational 
governance specifically encourages parties to pursue value-enhancing activities. Ghosh and John 
(2005) note how inter-firm contracts for truly new products are necessarily incomplete, which  
places a premium on flexible interfaces which permit parties to “seek, provide, and accept 
assistance” (Sosa 2014). Hence, activities that contribute to product novelty, even costly ones, 
will be initiated and implemented.
3
 
In the interest of balance, we identify a fourth sub-process, namely information search, 
which may actually be constrained by relational governance. Granovetter’s (1973) tie strength 
thesis suggests that reliance on strong ties may limit the access to new information in the first 
place and thus impede search. Moreover, strong ties may also be associated with a lack of novel 
knowledge because they hinder firms’ ability to 1) look for and identify knowledge and 2) move 
and incorporate knowledge across organizational boundaries. Hansen (1999) terms this dual 
challenge as the “search-transfer problem”. Nonetheless, the combined positive effect of the 
other three processes discussed above (i.e., information transfer, information use, and adaptation) 
suggests that relational governance is associated with product novelty. 
Thus, as a baseline expectation we suggest that relational governance practices that 
emerge in dense clusters will promote product novelty. 
Cluster Centralization and NPD Project Governance. Centralized clusters are those in 
which one or a few parties – often referred to as ‘hubs’ – have a disproportionately large number 
of connections to other members within the cluster. Highly centralized clusters are often 
                                                        
3
 We note that complex information processing and adaptation needs are defining characteristics of so-called 
“radical innovation” projects (Henderson and Clark 1990). Most likely, such projects will benefit the most from 
relational governance practices. By comparison, incremental innovations like line extensions can be managed in 
mechanistic fashions, on the basis of pre-existing plans and standard operating procedures. The inherent inflexibility 
of the latter types of practices, however, will represent a constraint for truly novel products where the key interfaces 
and marketing requirements are ill-defined a priori (Argote et al. 2003; Damanpour 1991; Sosa et al. 2004). 
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organized in a manner approximating a hub-and-spoke pattern (Provan et al. 2007). The central 
location of the hub organizations affords them greater influence over which interactions take 
place within the cluster and how they are governed (Arikan and Schilling 2011). The effects of 
cluster centralization can be understood in terms of a control logic. 
 In highly centralized clusters, hub firms assume a lead role in building common purpose 
and lending legitimacy to other members with which they are associated (Dhanaraj and Parkhe 
2006). A well-known example of a highly centralized cluster is the “Square Mile” financial 
services cluster in London, UK. This financial cluster is located in downtown London and the 
smaller Canary Warf region two and a half miles to the east. The industry is particularly 
concentrated with the largest four banks (Barclays, HSBC, Lloyds, Royal Bank of Scotland) 
accounting for 85% of the business current account market (Independent Commission on 
Banking 2011). 
We expect cluster centralization to promote hierarchical governance practices in a given 
cluster, for the following reasons. First, hub firms can use the power and information advantages 
that stem from their central network position to establish formal contracts and agreements in a 
given project, and unilaterally impose them on their partners [e.g., General Motors in its recent 
top down reorganization of its supply chain (Lassa 2014)]. Second, in light of these asymmetries 
hub firms in centralized clusters are further motivated to adopt hierarchical governance because 
it helps them to overcome decision obstacles and achieve efficient convergence through the 
careful specification of decision rights at each stage of the NPD process, from the early product 
idea through to commercialization (Wheelwright and Clark 1992). Third, hub firms that occupy 
central positions within clusters have, by definition, a greater than average number of 
connections with other member firms. This increases the likelihood that peripheral firms will 
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have been exposed to hierarchical governance practices (Argyres and Mayer 2007), which in turn 
makes it more likely that these firms will deploy such practices in their relationships with other 
less central cluster members. In other words, the actions and reach of hub firms support the 
normalization of hierarchical project governance across centralized clusters.  
For instance, in the London Square Mile example outlined above, centralization promotes 
control on the part of the cluster’s large banks. This facilitates a hierarchical system of 
governance both because it helps these hub firms enforce formal rules and because it has become 
the ‘standard’ way of organizing relationships in this cluster (Cook et al. 2007). Taken together, 
our arguments suggest that cluster centralization promotes hierarchical governance practices. We 
therefore propose that: 
Proposition 2: The greater the centralization of the overall cluster, the higher the 
likelihood that hierarchical governance practices can be brought to bear on a given NPD 
project. 
 
Consider next the likely project-level performance implications of hierarchical 
governance. We expect this form of governance to promote speed to market (Fang 2011; 
Rindfleisch and Moorman 2001), due to the availability of standardized rules and conflict 
resolution mechanisms. 
First, under hierarchical governance, the relevant relationships and interfaces are 
managed in a mechanistic “planning” mode (Burns and Stalker 1961; Thompson 1967), which 
allows for the setup of rules of engagement and standard operating procedures (Dahlstrom et al. 
1995; Stinchcombe 1986). Wheelwright and Clark (1992) illustrate such a governance mode in a 
new product development context through a so-called “project book” which specifies in advance 
the key requirements and procedures for a given project.  
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Second, because hierarchical governance provides specific blueprints for action 
(Eisenhardt and Tabrizi 1995), it creates efficiency by “preventing deviation” (Ulset 1996) and 
overcoming potential integration barriers in advance (Griffin and Hauser 1996; Sobrero and 
Roberts 2001). Any conflict that emerges between partners can be resolved according to a set of 
pre-determined protocols (Bstieler and Hemmert 2010; Gulati and Singh 1998) which translate 
into quick decision-making and ultimately speed to market for a given new product.
4
 
Volkswagen, for example, has sought to distinguish itself from other car manufacturers 
through a strong focus on environmental sustainability. As a result, VW requires all suppliers to 
adhere to a particular set of principles as they develop new components for a particular model. 
Suppliers deemed to fall short may be cut from the supply chain, “meaning that a supplier that 
does not fulfil required environmental and social standards will not be awarded a [future] 
sourcing contract” (Koplin et al. 2007, p. 1059).When Volkswagen opens a new production 
facility anywhere in the world, its first tier suppliers are contractually required to establish 
operations in a proximate location. This allows VW to build an extensive local supplier network 
quickly and efficiently that mimics its German operations, thereby facilitating the faster launch 
of existing products in new markets (Depner and Bathelt 2005). 
Thus, as a second baseline expectation we suggest that the hierarchical governance 
practices that emerge in centralized clusters will promote speed to market.
5
 
                                                        
4
 This begs the question of whether our other form of governance (i.e., relational) affects speed. We expect that 
aspects of relational governance, such as the limited need to qualify and monitor partners, may produce time 
economies. Moreover, trust and rich communication linkages can facilitate coordination  (Dyer and Singh 1998; 
Rowley et al. 2000). At the same time, the complex adaptation processes that characterize relational exchange 
(Eppinger 2001; Fang 2008) may have the opposite effect and actually undermine speed to market. 
5
 While hierarchical governance is inherently associated with speed, its mechanistic quality may only be suitable for 
familiar projects, where the causal ambiguity would not strain the focal rules (Adler 1995; Gerwin 2004; 
Venkataraman 1997). Specifically, hierarchical governance may only be appropriate for incremental innovations, 
where the product architecture and marketing requirements are well-understood a priori (Cohen et al. 1996; Sosa et 
al. 2004). Sivadas and Dwyer (2000) illustrate this point by arguing that a standard “Stage-Gate” process may not 
lend itself to radical innovations. For radical innovations, the likelihood of encountering exceptions during the 
process undermines the utility of fixed rules and plans. 
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The Moderating Effects of Cluster Configuration  
Propositions 1 and 2 above express how different aspects of cluster configuration – 
density and centralization – support the emergence of particular governance practices (relational, 
hierarchical) in the first place. These practices, in turn, are associated with particular new 
product outcomes. Next, we consider how cluster configuration may also play a second role; 
namely to enhance the effects of relational and hierarchical governance on their respective 
performance outcomes. Our core argument is that network density and centralization enhance 
clustered firms’ ability to fully exploit the two forms of governance.  
Consider again our expectation that relational governance will promote product novelty 
due to its ability to transfer tacit knowledge, support the use of new information, and help parties 
adapt to changing circumstances. We posit that cluster density augments the ability of clustered 
firms to capitalize upon the properties of relational governance ex post, and thus ensure that such 




First, because partners have the opportunity to interact more directly and frequently in 
dense clusters, density supports relational governance’s capability for information transmission 
and use. Ultimately, this increases the likelihood of the serendipitous discovery of new insights. 
For example, fully one-third of the approximately forty winemakers in the Clare Valley region in 
the South Australian wine cluster were, due to their dense connections, mobilized to sign off on, 
                                                        
6 We note a possible counterargument, which is that cluster density may impede the ability of clustered firms to 
capitalize upon the properties of relational governance. This is because density has been associated with redundancy 
(Burt 1992). Specifically, it has been argued (e.g., McFadyen et al. 2009; Rodan and Galunic 2004) that while 
density facilitates knowledge transfer it may also increase knowledge redundancy, which can constrain the novelty 
of knowledge that can be accessed. In other words, while density leads to increased opportunities for combining new 
knowledge, these opportunities may be offset by “combinatorial exhaustion” (Mahmood et al. 2013, p. 1526). While 
acknowledging this possibility, we align our arguments with Gnyawali and Madhavan (2001) who posit that firms in 
dense networks can take steps to mitigate redundancy problems by purposively structuring their own networks in 
order to eliminate redundant ties. 
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and take part in, the “Riesling with a twist” campaign. It was the dense pattern of winemakers in 
this small sub-region that promoted the sharing and deployment of information in the cluster, and 
made this collaborative initiative possible (Choi et al. 2010). 
Second, the opportunity for face-to-face interaction that is facilitated by cluster density 
allows regular informal monitoring of projects which, in turn, enables early identification of, and 
timely adjustments to, changing circumstances. For example, frequent and evolving 
collaborations between winemakers in the South Australian wine cluster and researchers at 
Roseworthy College (a University focusing on oenology research and located within the region) 
allowed partners in the Clare Valley identify and pursue ongoing refinements to the Stelvin 
closure technology (Taber 2009). Thus, network density helps promote product novelty due to its 
ability to support relational governance practices in a cluster over time. We therefore propose the 
following: 
Proposition 3: The effect of relational governance practices in an NPD project on   
product novelty will be enhanced by cluster density. 
 
Consider next the baseline expectation that the hierarchical governance of a cluster 
transaction will promote speed to market for a given product due to this governance form’s 
emphasis on rules and standard operating procedures and its transparent approach to conflict 
resolution. Here we posit that cluster centralization enhances the ability of clustered firms to 
exploit the benefits of hierarchical governance ex post. This is because network centralization 
supports the inherent coordination properties of hierarchical governance by enhancing firms’ 
ability to enforce formal governance practices. Specifically, communication flows in centralized 
clusters are likely to be clearer and more predictable as they are more likely to be mediated by a 
few dominant hub firms. The resulting clarity is likely to facilitate closer adherence to standards. 
For example, the location of VW’s flagship Autostadt car dealership in Wolfsburg, which is 
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close to its main production location and network of suppliers, facilitates rapid flows of 
information across the entire value chain (Kooijman and Sierksma 2007). 
When conflict does emerge, the enforcement of formal contracts is also less costly in 
centralized clusters because the actions of hub firms are more visible, which means that the 
invocation of explicit rules requires less effort. Where a hub firm sanctions a supplier, both the 
sanction and its effects will be more apparent in centralized clusters than in dense clusters 
because of the profile enjoyed by hub firms. This means that the reputational risks are higher for 
firms in centralized clusters and, therefore, the incentive to reach a speedy resolution will be 
greater. Volkswagen, for example, pioneered a local modular system of production in Brazil in 
which suppliers are responsible for whole subsystems of a given vehicle, with VW responsible 
for final assembly of the subsystems (Van Hoek and Weken 1998). Suppliers are co-located on 
the same site, with bridges physically connecting the suppliers to the main production facility. 
This centralized cluster structure allows VW to exert authority through “spatial and 
organizational contiguity” (Frigant and Lung 2002, p. 752), which induces supplier compliance. 
Ultimately, then, network centralization promotes speed to market, because it supports, on an on-
going basis, the ability of hierarchical governance to reduce friction between decision-makers. 
This line of argument leads to our fourth proposition: 
Proposition 4: The effect of hierarchical governance practices in an NPD project on 
speed to market will be enhanced by cluster centralization. 
 
Mismatch Scenarios 
Our preceding discussion has two key implications. First, the unique configuration of a 
cluster represents a particular source of governance practices in the first place. Second, to the 
extent that a given NPD project involves members of the same cluster, the firms in question 
subscribe to common governance practices. Conceptually, one may think of NPD activity in a 
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cluster context in terms of a particular temporary sub-network of firms that is defined by the 
project in question. The shared governance practices that characterize the interactions within the 
sub-network have unique performance implications (specifically, in terms of novelty and speed), 
due to particular matches between structure (configuration) and process (governance). 
From a theoretical standpoint, these propositions express Granovetter’s (1999) conjecture 
that micro-level governance practices cannot be studied in isolation, and that “context and 
action” interact (p. 192). Parallel arguments underlie emerging multi-level models of governance 
in transaction cost theory (e.g., Williamson 2000), although testable propositions regarding 
specific matches and their implications have been lacking. Our propositions build on earlier work 
(Antia and Frazier 2001; Wuyts and Geyskens 2005) to address this deficiency. 
The notion of matches between configuration and governance logically raises a follow-up 
question about mismatches and their effects. Conceivably, mismatches may be benign, to the 
extent that performance outcomes simply fail to materialize given a lack of fit between cluster 
configuration and project governance. It is possible, however, that mismatches may have more 
dramatic effects, and actually impede performance by producing coordination “gaps” at key 
points of a product development process (Gerwin 2004; Heath and Staudenmayer 2000) and 
giving rise to incremental transaction costs.   
In the sections below, we examine two different types of mismatches. The first pertains to  
misalignment between the governance of a particular project and the cluster’s overall 
configuration. The second type is mismatches from using different (and potentially incompatible) 
governance mechanisms in different relationships within a given project.  
Governance vs. Configuration Mismatches. Consider again P3 and the interaction 
between relational governance and cluster density on product novelty. Our rationale for this 
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prediction hinged on the ability of a dense cluster to support relational norms’ capacity to 
promote novel product outcomes. More specifically, we expected dense clusters to facilitate the 
ongoing transfer of tacit information, support the use of new information, and improve partners’ 
ability to adapt to changing circumstances, thereby increasing the potential for product novelty.  
In contrast, consider how relational governance may function within a centralized cluster, 
where hub firms represent dominant authority structures. Such a scenario may happen because of 
changing cluster dynamics, or due to firm entry or exit. For example, as a dense cluster matures, 
a number of dominant hub firms may emerge or a new dominant firm may relocate from 
elsewhere. Because relational norms developed over time are “sticky” (Li et al. 2010) they may 
remain in place, at least for some time, but the resource advantages of the hub firms means that 
the cluster’s overall configuration changes from density to centralization7. For example, the 
technology cluster in Cambridge (England) – “Silicon Fen” – was originally characterized by a 
dense pattern of firms in the software and electronics industries. As the cluster has developed, 
however, it has become increasingly dominated by a small number of hub firms, of which 
semiconductor design company ARM is the most important. This has changed the structure of 
the cluster to a relatively centralized one, although the relational norms that characterized its 
formative years have broadly remained in place (Garnsey and Heffernan 2005).   
The above scenario represents a mismatch that hinders the ability of relational 
governance to generate novel products. First, the normal capacity to process tacit information 
will be constrained by the relative lack of ties in a centralized cluster, which impedes informal 
communication. This is because firms are less likely to have the opportunity to develop the 
                                                        
7
 Note that while networks may possess a degree of both density and centralization, they cannot be simultaneously 
maximized (Morrissey et al. 1994). A key theoretical assumption underlying our framework is that density and 
centralization do not constitute endpoints on a single continuum. 
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particular relationship building skills required for relational governance. Equally important, 
centralization weakens a cluster’s on-going socialization processes, and thus the ability of firms 
to coordinate as “unitary actors”. In fact, the threat of unilateral enforcement by a central hub 
firm has the potential to “crowd out” the bilateral norms that underpin relational governance 
(Deci et al. 1999; Osterloh and Frey 2000) and therefore any experimental or creative ways in 
which partners might use and combine new information. Finally, centralized clusters inhibit 
informal monitoring, which relies on frequent communication by multiple parties, thereby 
increasing the potential for inertia around dominant firms’ rules and thus reducing partner firms’ 
ability to adapt to changing circumstances. In a centralized cluster, then, using relational norms 
to promote novelty may be ineffective.  In proposition form: 
Proposition 5: The effect of relational governance practices in an NPD project on 
product novelty will weaken at higher levels of cluster centralization. 
 
Next, consider P4 that focused on the interaction between hierarchical governance and 
cluster centralization on speed to market. The logic of the match scenario underlying P4 was 
based on a centralized cluster’s ability to facilitate conformance to rules and standard operating 
procedures through clear lines of authority and communication, and the efficient resolution of 
conflict, thus reducing friction and promoting speed to market. Theoretically, the combination of 
formal rules and enforcement by centralized authority reflects an internally consistent Weberian 
(1947) “ideal type” of governance system. 
In contrast, consider how hierarchical governance is likely to function within a dense 
cluster. As an example, this may happen when intellectual property concerns are acute. Thus 
firms in a dense cluster may be involved in developing products for a commercially very 
sensitive new technology. This may require cluster members to adhere to hierarchical 
governance practices even though the overall configuration does not support such practices. 
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Silicon Valley, for instance, remains one of the largest recipients of defense contracts in the 
United States (Leslie 2000), almost all of which are governed in a hierarchical manner despite 
the dense structure of the Silicon Valley cluster.  
The above scenario represents a mismatch, because the formal governance rules in 
question lack obvious channels of authority and thus recourse to strong guidelines and remedies 
should they be required. Indeed, the use of fixed rules in such a situation, in which frequent and 
informal interactions normally underpin relationship norms, may be viewed as illegitimate. In 
addition to increasing markedly the costs of invoking formal rules, this may render them largely 
ineffective in facilitating on-going decision-making. For example, analysis of the use of formal 
contracting in Silicon Valley has found that it “elevate[s] transaction costs, imperil[s] economic 
activity, and foster[s] interorganizational discord” (Suchman and Cahill 1996, p. 679). In these 
circumstances, the reputational risk for parties that seek to enforce hierarchical governance 
practices when conflict arises may be greater than for parties that are deemed to have broken the 
rules. In a dense cluster, then, using fixed rules and unilateral enforcement of conflict resolution 
with the goal of promoting speed is likely to cause discord, which is counterproductive from a 
time to market standpoint. We therefore propose the following:   
Proposition 6: The effect of hierarchical governance practices in an NPD project on 




Intra-project Mismatches. Propositions 5 and 6 above expressed the effects of 
mismatches between a cluster’s larger configuration and the mechanisms used to govern the 
relationships between the individual parties to the project. In developing these mismatch 
                                                        
8
 We focus on mismatches that impede governance mechanisms’ value-creation effect. We note that past research 
has reported interactions between structure and process that would appear to constitute mismatches in our 
framework, but which actually have efficient outcomes. For instance, Wuyts and Geyskens (2005) show that the 
combination of tight contracts and network embeddedness suppresses opportunism. This is an important finding, but 
its key contribution is to show how a certain combination of structure and process mitigates negative outcomes 
(rather than promoting positive ones).   
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scenarios, we assumed that the different relationship-level governance mechanisms themselves 
were compatible with each other, given the parties’ common cluster membership which provides  
access to similar governance practices. 
We now consider an alternative type of mismatch; one that follows from the use of 
different governance mechanisms (relational vs. hierarchical) across relationships within a 
particular NPD project. Past research has suggested that different governance mechanisms may 
indeed be incompatible with each other (Heide et al. 2007; Kumar et al. 2011), but the 
implications for new product development have not been explored.  
As a specific example, assume that a particular NPD project, which comprises a set of 
incumbent cluster firms (e.g., supplier, product designer, manufacturer) that share pre-existing 
relational governance practices, requires a sub-assembly component from a new supplier that is 
located outside of the cluster. The new supplier is not only unfamiliar with the cluster’s relational 
practices; it may be approaching the project with a distinctly hierarchical mindset originating, 
perhaps, from transactions within a different cluster. 
Such a situation represents a particular form of mismatch. The existing relational 
governance practices between the incumbent firms have the potential, as per our earlier 
discussion, to promote product novelty. For instance, the transfer of tacit information is 
facilitated by a “thick” organizational interface. This prerequisite is lacking, however, if the new 
supplier subscribes to different governance practices. If this supplier does not share the pre-
existing relational norms, information transfer and use at critical stages of the NPD process will 
be impeded. In addition, without common norms key adaptations at vital project junctures may 
not take place. Ultimately, then, the opportunity to bring a novel product to market will be 
compromised. In proposition form: 
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Proposition 7: The effect of relational governance practices in an NPD project on 
product novelty will weaken given hierarchical governance practices in connected 
project relationships. 
 
Finally, consider a mismatch scenario where the incumbent firms in a cluster (e.g., 
upstream suppliers, designers, manufacturer) share hierarchical governance practices, but are 
working with a reseller in a particular market outside the cluster whose pre-existing governance 
mode is relational in nature. Here, the downstream reseller will have difficulty abiding by the 
incumbent firms’ fixed rules and monitoring practices. As a consequence, the usual ability of 
hierarchical governance to promote speed to market, as per our earlier discussion, will be 
compromised. Again, a governance mismatch produces friction which undermines performance. 
We summarize the preceding discussion with the following proposition:        
Proposition 8: The ability of hierarchical governance practices in an NPD project on 
speed to market will weaken given relational governance practices in connected project 
relationships. 
Discussion 
In this final section we begin by explaining how our conceptual framework informs three 
different bodies of research, namely new product development, inter-firm governance, and 
regional clusters, respectively. Next, we sketch out some key implications for marketing practice 
and decision-making. We close with a discussion of topics for future research.  
Theoretical Implications  
Implications for New Product Research. In a comprehensive review of the new product 
development literature, Hauser et al. (2006) pointed to the different academic fields which have 
studied innovation. At the same time, they also noted a striking lack of linkages between these 
streams of work. One of our current aims was to develop such linkages by bringing together 
extant work on NPD, regional clusters, and inter-firm governance. In general, our framework 
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provides a macro-level perspective on new product development; a perspective that remains 
relatively underutilized in marketing (Tellis 2013). 
Increasingly, firms’ new product initiatives involve external parties such as suppliers and 
resellers (Rindfleisch and Moorman 2001). This, in turn, suggests that firms’ NPD strategies 
must account for inter-firm governance issues. Our framework shows that a cluster, by virtue of 
its particular configuration, is a source of governance practices in the first place. This has 
potentially important implications. To the extent that the interactions between the different up- 
and downstream members of a NPD process are guided by cluster-wide governance practices, it 
reduces friction which can otherwise compromise new product outcomes. As such, if clustering 
helps to generate joint governance ground rules among firms, it represents a considerable source 
of efficiency. 
Implications for Research on Inter-firm Governance. Our framework has implications for 
the literature on inter-firm governance, in particular for its transaction cost branch. We highlight 
four particular ones. First, we build on prior work (e.g., Ghosh and John 1999; Ghosh and John 
2005) which suggests that firms’ governance choices have value-creating effects that go beyond 
suppressing opportunism per se.  
Second, while the focus of past governance research has often been on the micro-level 
mechanisms themselves, we add to a relatively small literature in marketing (e.g., Antia and 
Frazier 2001; Wuyts and Geyskens 2005) which shows that the context in which governance 
mechanisms are deployed matters. In our framework, we capture context through the cluster 
configuration construct, and posit that new product outcomes follow from appropriate matches 
between governance mechanisms and cluster configuration. Importantly, we highlight the dual 
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role of configuration as 1) an ex ante driver of governance practices and 2) an ex post facilitator 
of performance.  
Third, we have identified cluster density as a specific source of relational governance. In 
extant transaction cost theory the governance mechanisms themselves are typically treated as 
exogenous, which has raised questions about how certain governance practices actually come 
about. In particular, researchers (e.g., Ghosh and John 2012) have questioned how relational 
mechanisms emerge in the first place. Given the importance of relational governance, as 
evidenced by the sizeable literature that has emerged since Macaulay’s (1963) seminal paper, 
this is an important question, and our cluster-based reasoning sheds light on the issue.  
Finally, our explicit consideration of how governance practices come about points to 
possible constraints on transaction cost theory’s “discriminating alignment” principle 
(Williamson 2010). At its core, transaction cost theory remains a normative framework, whose 
distinct strength is the articulation of a firm’s motivation to deploy particular governance 
mechanisms. The theory is less explicit, however, about a firm’s ability to do so. Our framework 
suggests that ability resides in the particular nature of the context (a cluster in this instance) in 
which a firm is embedded. This also suggests, however, that constraints may exist on firms’ 
governance choices, and that firms may face limited governance “menus” by virtue of their 
geographic location. For instance, relational mechanisms may not be readily available in 
centralized clusters. In general, our present arguments point to the need for joint considerations 
of motivation and ability in making governance decisions.  
Implications for Cluster Research. Research on clusters across the social sciences, both in 
geography (e.g., Asheim and Isaksen 2002; Keeble and Wilkinson 1999) and economics (e.g., 
Kaldor 1972; Krugman 1991; McCann and Sheppard 2003) has generally considered 
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performance at the aggregate level of the cluster. As noted, however, while there exists evidence 
of successful clusters, there are also many documented instances of unsuccessful ones. This 
suggests a need for more fine-grained theoretical explanations of performance that go beyond 
clustering per se. We believe our framework represents an initial step towards providing such an 
explanation. Specifically, we take a “bottom up” or disaggregated perspective, based on the 
assumption that understanding cluster performance requires, as a starting point, explicit attention 
to how individual cluster projects are governed. The larger cluster configuration matters, but in 
our framework its primary roles are to help set up governance practices and then to facilitate 
their impact on NPD performance.  
Managerial Implications 
While detailed managerial prescriptions must await empirical testing, we offer two 
suggestions for marketing decision-making, pertaining to 1) the role of firm location, and 2) the 
management of the new product conversion process. 
The Role of Location. Our discussion of cluster configuration suggests that a firm’s 
geographical location may support as well as constrain its new product decisions. As a 
consequence, a firm’s new product objectives must be considered against the backdrop of its 
location options. For instance, firms for which product novelty is paramount should favor dense 
clusters due to their relational governance practices which inherently support such outcomes. As 
a specific example, in 1999 financial services firm J.P. Morgan took a strategic decision to locate 
its European Technology Center – a division charged with developing novel and complex 
financial software and technology systems to support J.P. Morgan’s global operations – in 
Glasgow, Scotland. Glasgow is known for its dense connections among firms, and for its focus 
on high-value R&D and product development in the ICT industry, a fact that has earned the 
region the moniker “Silicon Glen” (Aziz et al. 2011). In a parallel fashion, firms for which speed 
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to market is paramount should favor centralized clusters due to their hierarchical governance 
practices which inherently support such outcomes. For example, the shoe cluster in Sinos Valley, 
Southern Brazil, has seen rapid growth in the presence of international footwear manufacturers, 
particularly from the US, which are attracted in part by its hierarchical nature, which allowed 
firms to produce large volumes of standardized products which could be brought to market 
quickly (Humphrey and Schmitz 2002). 
Our framework also suggests that location may come to represent an external constraint 
(c.f., Pfeffer and Salancik 1978), and require a firm to consider strategic realignment (or, 
possibly, relocation, depending on the relative level of reversibility of both its location and 
strategy decisions). For example, firms whose strategies involve product novelty may experience 
challenges in centralized clusters, and they may benefit from changes to their strategy. Such a 
dynamic is evident in the whisky cluster in Scotland where firms have altered radically their 
strategy in recent decades in response to changing market conditions. Specifically, as 
supermarkets have asserted their buying power and Scotch whisky has been subject to greater 
international competition, they have placed much greater emphasis on efficiency and speed to 
market. This has seen the whisky cluster evolve from a “cottage industry” comprising many 
producers and a fragmented supply chain of malters, cooperages (barrel makers), bottling plants, 
and distributors, to a consolidated structure in which three multinational companies (Diageo, 
Allied-Domecq and Seagrams) are responsible for 80% of production. These firms have 
reshaped the supply chain from one characterized by informal relationships between artisans to 
one characterized by “centralized decision making” (Whittam and Danson 2001, p. 960) on the 
part of dominant players. As a result, smaller producers with a traditional focus on product 
differentiation have been required to make strategic changes including “significant investment in 
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just-in-time techniques” and the development of “larger and more efficient bottling plants and 
distilleries” (Whittam and Danson 2001, p. 957) in order to adapt to the increasingly centralized 
nature of the cluster. 
Alternatively, firms whose strategies involve speed to market may be constrained by 
cluster density. Ultimately, such constraints could require firms to make costly trade-offs 
between strategy realignment and relocation. The Pittsburgh steel industry is an example of a 
cluster that has transitioned from a highly centralized structure, one dominated by a handful of 
very large steel mills, to a fragmented structure of smaller mini-mills and ancillary firms focused 
on design, engineering, drafting, welding and machining services, following the collapse of the 
high volume steel manufacture in the 1980s. With the largest firms in decline and heading 
towards bankruptcy, the small firms that remained survived by changing their strategy away 
from the mass manufacture or processing of steel to the provision of specialized services that 
rely on innovation. In doing so, these firms have engaged in high levels of collaboration 
including “joint-bidding for contracts and co-operating in provision of complementary services” 
(Cooke 1996, p. 165). 
Managing the New Product Conversion Process. The particular constructs that our 
framework comprises are likely to play crucial roles in shaping a new product’s conversion 
(Chandy et al. 2006; Ulrich and Eppinger 2011), namely from an initial idea to a concept, and 
from concept to marketed product. Interestingly, the cluster literature has historically limited its 
focus to the initial idea generation stage of a new product development process, based on the 
expectation that co-located firms benefit from knowledge spillovers. Our framework suggests 
that the benefits of clustering extend beyond idea generation per se, by virtue of aligning key 
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interfaces between the relevant upstream (e.g., suppliers) and downstream (e.g., resellers) parties 
that comprise an NPD process.  
Achrol and Kotler (1999) note the “traditional marketing struggle” involved in achieving 
integration between R&D, design, and consumer research. While managing just one of these 
interfaces represents a considerable challenge, favorable new product outcomes ultimately 
depend on how the entire set of inter-firm relationships are governed. To the extent that the 
relevant participants in a given NPD project subscribe to common governance practices, it goes a 
long way to overcoming possible obstacles. Specifically, the ability to bring joint governance 
practices to bear on a particular cluster project increases the likelihood that both 1) an initial idea 
will be successfully converted into an appropriate concept, and 2) the concept will subsequently 
be converted into a full-fledged marketed product. 
For example, the development by General Motors of the Chevrolet Volt – one of the first 
mass manufactured plug-in hybrid electric vehicles – was facilitated by the emergence of a series 
of firms and research institutes within the Detroit automotive cluster specializing in different 
aspects of electric vehicle design and production such as capacitors, electronics for thermal 
management, and fuel cells (Lyon and Baruffi 2011). GM was able to take advantage of the 
centralized structure of the Detroit automotive cluster, its status as a hub firm within it, and its 
existing distribution network in order to successfully convert the initial product idea into a 
marketed product in a remarkably short time.        
Directions for Future Research 
Our framework suggests specific opportunities for future research. First, an obvious 
starting point would be to test the model empirically. As with any empirical studies of clusters, 
researchers would face a number of core challenges, including the delineation of cluster 
boundaries and the determination of cluster membership (Feser and Bergman 2000; O’Donoghue 
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and Gleave 2004). Moreover, there are challenges in measuring project performance, although 
marketers have developed robust measures of both the dependent variables in our framework – 
speed to market and product novelty (Rindfleisch and Moorman 2001) – which have been 
operationalized effectively in a cluster context (Ganesan et al. 2005). 
Second, there may be more complex constellations of variables that influence particular 
governance choices, such as national culture, which are not included in our model. For example, 
Japanese manufacturers like Toyota are known for their use of relational governance practices in 
supplier relationships (Sako 2004), yet the clusters in which these firms operate are highly 
centralized. This seems to contradict our model, which posits that centralized clusters will tend to 
exhibit cluster-wide hierarchical governance practices. One plausible explanation for this 
apparent inconsistency is that Japan’s national culture provides a set of informal constraints “that 
serve to economize on the transaction costs of achieving cooperation” (Hill 1995, p. 121), which 
is not available to firms in the West [see also Achrol (1997) and Dyer and Chu (2003)]. Thus 
future research could usefully consider the influence of culture and other national institutions on 
governance decisions within clusters. 
Third, in order to highlight some basic relationships between cluster configuration, 
project-level governance, and new product outcomes we limited ourselves to stating basic linear 
relationships between the different variables. It is possible, however, that some of the 
relationships in question are more complex than that. For instance, some of the relationships may 
be associated with threshold effects of various kinds. As a specific example, strong relational 
norms may produce conditions of “over-embeddedness” (Granovetter 1985) and “groupthink” 
(Janis 1982) that undermine parties’ efforts and ultimately new product outcomes (Argote et al. 
2003; Ayers et al. 1997). At the very least, this suggests that relational governance may be 
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subject to diminishing marginal returns (Wuyts and Geyskens 2005) with respect to novelty. 
Somewhat similarly, while we implicitly suggested that cluster density would have general 
governance benefits, there may exist a threshold beyond which the number of ties actually serves 
as a constraint on a firm’s ability to communicate with partners face-to-face.    
Fourth, a key feature of clusters is the geographic proximity of the firms in question 
(Bathelt et al. 2004). However, the distances spanning cluster members can vary significantly 
between clusters (Martin and Sunley 2003). While Ganesan et al.’s (2005) research raised 
questions about the role of proximity per se in new product development, it is conceivable that 
proximity may serve certain moderating purposes within our framework. For instance, the effect 
of cluster density on relational governance may be enhanced by the relevant parties’ proximity, 
since it promotes the establishment of interaction rules and thus facilitates inter-firm 
socialization processes (Morgan 2004). Further, proximity may strengthen the effect of 
centralization on hierarchical governance, since it facilitates the negotiation of unilateral 
contracts (Gilson et al. 2009). Another possibility is that proximity may actually have deleterious 
effects on product outcomes in some circumstances. For example, proximity can promote the 
development of cliques, which may undermine the effectiveness of relational governance 
(Gnyawali and Madhavan 2001). As a specific example, Giuliani’s (2007) study of three wine 
clusters in Chile and Italy shows that “in spite of the presence of pervasive business interactions” 
within these relational clusters, the existence of cliques means that “innovation-related 
knowledge is exchanged in a rather uneven and selective way” (p. 163), which undermines 




Finally, interesting research questions also pertain to the content of the relationships 
between cluster members. Our current focus was on these relationships’ economic dimension, as 
reflected in their governance mechanisms. However, cluster relationships are likely multiplex in 
nature, in that they comprise social as well as economic elements (Heide et al. 2007; Uzzi 1996; 
Wasserman and Faust 1994). As shown by Tuli, Bharadwaj, and Kohli (2010), multiplexity is 
associated with benefits, such as access to private information. For instance, the Cambridge 
technology cluster, for which the University of Cambridge represents a key institution, benefits 
from a unique communication channel, namely the University’s college structure (Dacin et al. 
2010).   
We note, however, that the social dimension of cluster relationships may impose costs as 
well as benefits. As such, multiplexity may have complex effects: Dahl and Sorenson (2012) 
suggest a “regional embeddedness” thesis, which describes how entrepreneurs’ preferences for a 
home region may influence their location choices above and beyond financial considerations. 
From this perspective, a decision maker’s preference for spending time with friends and family 
may serve as a distraction and cause acceptance of lower financial rewards. In general, this 
reinforces the view that theorizing about more complex models of clusters is warranted. We hope 
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